CASE COMMENTARIES
REAL ESTATE – DISCLOSURES
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a real estate seller has an
obligation to disclose material defects in addition to the conditions
specified by the Residential Property Disclosure Act, and log
construction of a home is not a material defect or an adverse fact
requiring disclosure by the real estate licensee under the Tennessee
Residential Property Disclosures Act. Oliver v. Pulse, No. W201900750-COA-R3-CV, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 14, 2020).
Patrick Clarke
In Oliver v. Pulse, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee addressed
whether a real estate agent who failed to advise his clients to disclose the
log construction of their home breached his statutory duty as a real estate
licensee. Oliver v. Pulse, No. W2019-00750-COA-R3-CV, 2020 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 156. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-5-201 et seq. define the duty to advise
sellers to disclose conditions of improved real property. The duty is limited
to those conditions specifically set forth in the disclosure form required
by Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-2-201, and is provided in sample form by Tenn.
Code Ann. § 66-5-210. The court considered whether log construction, a
condition not listed in the aforementioned statutes, rose to the level of a
material defect or an adverse fact requiring disclosure. Upon review, the
court confirmed that a licensee’s duty encompasses a duty to advise about
material defects and adverse facts; however, they also determined that the
log construction of the home was, in itself, neither a material defect nor
an adverse fact. Therefore, the real estate agent had not breached any duty.
In 1999, Harold and Patsy Oliver purchased a log home in
Hardeman County, Tennessee. At the time of purchase, the log exterior
was completely hidden by vinyl siding. The Olivers made various
improvements to the property including finishing the interior with
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sheetrock, and as a result, “the house no longer looked like a log home.”
Odom v. Oliver, 310 S.W.3d 344, 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). In 2005, when
the Olivers decided to sell the house, they enlisted the services of licensed
real estate agent Todd Pulse of Results Realty. Although the Olivers
informed Pulse about the nature of their home, his disclosure documents
to potential buyers did not mention anything about the original log
construction. Later that year, William and Abby Odom purchased the
home. Notably, they declined to have any inspections done to the
property. In July 2006, a storm blew a section of the exterior siding off
and the Odoms learned for the first time that the house’s structure was
composed of logs. Although unknown to the Olivers and Pulse before
the sale, the Odoms also discovered that some of the logs were rotting
from water damages and would cost approximately $120,000 to repair.
The Odoms brought action against the Olivers, Pulse, and Results
Realty, seeking recission of the 2005 purchase agreement of the property
alleging fraudulent concealment and violation of the Tennessee
Residential Property Disclosures Act (“the Act”); the trial court awarded
summary judgment to all defendants. On appeal, the court affirmed the
judgment in favor of Pulse and Results Realty, but reversed summary
judgment in favor of the Olivers, holding that there was a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether they had a duty to disclose the log
construction. In April 2013, the Odoms voluntarily withdrew their claims
and ended that action.
Meanwhile, in June 2009, the Olivers filed this action against Pulse
and Results Realty, essentially claiming Pulse breached his statutory duty
by failing to advise them to disclose the log construction to the Odoms,
causing the Olivers to incur substantial legal costs. After a decade-long
battle of competing motions and introductions of evidence and testimony,
the trial court heard the parties’ final motions for summary judgment in
February 2019. They held that “while a seller is required by law to disclose
material facts… an agent’s duty to his client/seller under Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 66-5-206 extends only to advising the client/seller’s disclosure of those
property conditions specifically listed on the statutory disclosure form.”
Pulse, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156 at *13. According to the trial court,
Pulse had complied with his statutory duty and was insulated from any
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liability. On April 3rd, 2019, the judge entered an order denying the
Olivers’ renewed motion and granting Pulse and Results Realty’s motion
for summary judgment. The Olivers appealed, alleging (1) the trial court
erred in construing the statute to preclude Pulse’s liability to the Olivers
and thus erroneously granted summary judgment to the defendants, and
(2) the trial court erred in denying the Olivers’ motion for summary
judgment by finding a material fact existed regarding Pulse’s statutory
duty.
After noting that the record is to be reviewed de novo with no
presumption of correctness, the court addressed the primary issue: the
statutory duty of a real estate licensee to his client/seller. The court notes
that Odom confirmed that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether
the log construction was material and required disclosure, but it did not
directly address Pulse’s statutory duty to advise the Olivers of their
disclosure obligations.
The Act requires the owners to furnish a residential property
disclosure statement to potential buyers regarding the condition of the
property along with any material defects. Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-201.
The court considers Pulse’s assertion that the Act limits disclosure
obligations to those conditions that are specifically listed on the disclosure
form, which does not contain the term “log construction.” The court
observes that the form includes good faith disclosure of structural
elements such as walls and foundation, and any modifications made
without necessary permits or not in compliance with building codes. The
court agrees with Seller’s proposition that the form does and cannot
contain every item that the seller might be required to disclose. The court
emphasizes that it has previously found that the Act requires the seller to
include any material defects in addition to those listed on the form. The
court also notes that, under the ruling in Ledbetter, a real estate agent has a
duty to inform their clients of their rights and obligations under the Act.
Ledbetter v. Schacht, 395 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (holding
that agent was properly granted summary judgment because she had no
knowledge of adverse facts affecting the integrity of the property).
Considering the statutes and rulings in turn, the court affirms the
trial court on a different basis, and holds that an owner/seller’s duty to
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buyers includes an obligation to disclose known material defects beyond
those specifically listed on the sample form. Additionally, the court held
that a real estate agent’s duty includes advising his clients of this obligation
and disclosing any other adverse facts. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-5-202.
Adverse facts, as defined by the Act, are “conditions or occurrences
generally recognized by competent licensees that significantly reduce the
structural integrity of improvements to real property, or present a
significant health risk to occupants of the property.” Tenn. Code Ann. §
62-13-102(2). Furthermore, the court determines that the Act will only
protect a real estate agent from liability if (1) the agent has informed the
client of their duties and obligations, and (2) if the agent has fulfilled their
duty to disclose known adverse facts. Pulse, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156
at *22.
The court concluded that, while the plain language of the Act
defined Pulse’s duties and obligations, the record does not contain any
proof that the log construction was a material defect requiring disclosure.
Reflecting on the record in Odom, the court affirmed that a log home is
not defective in and of itself, and recognized that the log home
construction was not an “adverse fact” that Pulse or the Olivers had any
duty to disclose. In light of the circumstances, the court held Pulse
fulfilled his statutory duties and the defendants were entitled to summary
judgment.
The court now considers the secondary issue, which is the denial
of the Olivers’ motion for summary judgment. The Olivers assert that,
because the trial court made a mistake in determining Pulse’s statutory
duty, the court erred by denying their motion for summary judgment with
respect to breach and causation. Essentially, the Olivers assert that Pulse’s
failure to advise them to disclose the log-frame construction is a breach of
his duty to advise. The court begins their analysis by noting that neither
the Olivers nor Pulse had any knowledge that the logs were in a rotting
condition.
The court notes that the main issue underlying this question is
whether or not the log construction was a material fact that Pulse had a
duty to advise the Olivers to disclose. Upon review of the record, the
court determines that there is nothing to demonstrate that the log
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construction was a defect that the Olivers were obligated to disclose.
Reaffirming the testimony from the Odom case, the court reiterates that
“there’s nothing inherently deficient about log home construction as
opposed to any other if it’s maintained properly.” Pulse, 2020 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 156 at *25. Because the rotting condition was unknown to both
parties, the court determined that there was no proof that Pulse had a duty
to advise the Olivers to disclose the log construction and affirmed the trial
court’s denial of the Olivers’ motion for summary judgment.
The court concludes by reviewing the Tennessee standards for the
application of summary judgment and holds that Pulse and Results Realty
are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine
issue of fact as to whether Pulse breached his duty to the Olivers under
the Act.
This case pertains to those transactional lawyers who are involved
in the Tennessee real estate market. Although a somewhat narrow
holding, as log construction makes up a minority of the houses in the state,
the case highlights the importance of advising clients to be fully aware of
the properties that they are selling or buying. Sellers are required to
disclose material defects and real estate licensees are required to inform
the sellers of this obligation and disclose any additional adverse facts. Any
lawyer involved in Tennessee real estate must be sure to advise clients to
have any potential property inspected thoroughly so there are no postpurchase surprises leading to costly and lengthy lawsuits.
Though the problem addressed in this specific case involved log
construction, any number of hidden issues can impact the viability of a
real estate transaction. Investing in property is commonly the most
expensive purchase a client will make in their lifetime. As a transactional
lawyer practicing in Tennessee, it is your job to protect your client’s
investment by insisting on thorough research and inspection of any
potential property being purchased. As they always say, “Buyers Beware.”
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CONTRACTS – CORPORATIONS AND PROPER ASSIGNMENT
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a former shareholder is
not authorized, without a valid assignment, to assert claims on
behalf of their former corporation, and the continuing violations
doctrine is not a catch-all for expired statute of limitations claims.
Hight v. Tramel, No. M2019-00845-COA-R3-CV, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS,
2020 WL 6748789 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2020).
Grayson Holmes
In, Hight v. Tramel, the Tennessee Court of Appeals is presented
with whether the Chancery Court for Davidson Country (“trial court”)
erred in finding (1) no valid assignment between Action Security and
Clarence Hight, (2) Mr. Hight could not go forward with a breach of
contract action on behalf of Action Security, (3) Mr. Hight could not
utilize the saving statue, and (4) Mr. Hight’s personal claims against the
defendants were barred due to the statute of limitations, despite the
continuing violations doctrine. This Court of Appeal held that the trial
court did not err in its judgments.
Plaintiff and Appellant Clarence Hight served as the president of
a security system installation company, Action Security Systems, Inc. Eric
Roberts is the current shareholding owner of Action Alarms at the time
of this case. The two defendants are Donald Tramel, a former employee
of Action Security, and A.C.E. Alarms. Tramel left Action Security to
work for A.C.E. Alarms. The facts and procedural history of this case are
laid out to provide a full understanding of the context of this court’s ruling.
The pertinent laws at issue will be discussed as well as the impact of this
ruling for practicing attorneys.
In March 2013, Hight hired a computer expert to investigate
Tramel because Hight suspected Tramel had copied files from Action
Security's computers. By April 2013, Hight knew Tramel went to work
for A.C.E. Alarms. Tramel worked for A.C.E. Alarms until February
2014. In May 2014, Action Security filed a lawsuit against Tramel and
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A.C.E. Alarms, alleging that they were soliciting customers and employees
of Action Security. Unbeknownst to the defendants, Hight, his wife, and
his daughter, the only three shareholders of Action Security, had sold their
shares of the company to Eric Roberts while the case was pending. The
purchase and sale agreement between Hight and Roberts did not discuss
pending litigation.
On March 14, 2016, Hight and Roberts executed a Settlement
Agreement to resolve their disputes that had arisen since the sale of the
company. The Settlement Agreement stated that it was between the two
respective parties. The agreement contained a provision stating the
current lawsuit in question was made on behalf of Action Security when
the company was owned and operated by Hight, and “any and all
judgements” should be made to Hight. Roberts and Hight signed the
Settlement Agreement in their respective names only.
Action Security’s lawsuit was voluntarily nonsuited and was
dismissed on August 30, 2016, in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01.
On February 1, 2017, Hight filed this lawsuit individually and on behalf of
Action Security Systems. Hight asserted a claim for breach of contract
against Tramel based on his employment agreement with Action Security.
Hight asserted claims against both defendants for unfair competition,
violating the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act, diminishing the value
of Action Security, and causing Hight to suffer a “loss of value” when he
sold Action Security.
The defendants filed for summary judgment arguing that Action
Security was a distinct legal entity from Roberts, Action Security must be
a party to assign its rights, and Hight’s individual claims are barred by
various statutes of limitations. In response to the motions for summary
judgment, Hight maintained that he could pursue claims for Action
Security based on a contractual assignment in the Settlement Agreement.
Hight argued his authorization was "clearly the intent of the parties to the
Settlement Agreement." The trial court granted summary judgment for
the defendants on all claims; finding that Action Security was not a party
or signatory to the Settlement Agreement, nor did the agreement manifest
any intent of Action Security’s transfer any of its interests. Hight appealed
the trial court’s decision.
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The Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s
decision de novo with no presumption of correctness in the trial court’s
ruling. The Court of Appeals followed the reasoning of Action Chiropractic
Clinic, LLC v. Hyler, 467 S.W.3d 409 (Tenn. 2015), which held that an
“assignment” is a transfer of a right from one person to another. To
determine if an assignment is valid, the court looked to the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s ruling in West v. Shelby Cnty. Healthcare Corp., holding that
courts must look at the plain language of the contract and find evidence
of intent from a party to transfer his or her rights. West v. Shelby Cnty.
Healthcare Corp., 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014). The evidence must describe
the subject matter of the assignment, be clear and unequivocal, and be
noticed by the person who the assignment is to be transferred. Id.
Therefore, a party’s intent to transfer an interest must be manifested by
the other party. To determine a manifested intent to transfer an interest
all the circumstances surrounding the contract must be interpreted. Collier
v. Greenbriar Developers, LLC, 358 S.W.3d 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
In Tennessee, when a party has deliberately chosen to do business
in a corporate form, even if they are the only stockholder, the party and
corporation remain separate legal entities. Keller v. Estate of McRedmond, 495
S.W.3d 852 (Tenn. 2016). A party and corporation can be each sued
distinctly. A contract, by itself, is decisive as to which entity the parties
intended to be involved in the agreement. To determine the intent of the
contract, the Court of Appeals looked to its previous holding in Bill Walker
& Assocs., Inc. v. Parrish, 770 S.W.2d 764 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), stating that
a court must look to the signature line of a contract. If the party signed
only his or her name, that party assumes a personal obligation. However,
if a party signed his or her name proceeded by the company’s name and
followed by his or her position in the company, only the corporation is
bound to the contract. Associated Shopping Ctr. Properties, LTD. v. Hodge, No.
M2010-00039-COA-R3-CV, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 138 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Mar. 22, 2011).
The court disagreed with Hight’s argument that he could sue on
behalf of Action Security based upon “the plain language of the settlement
agreement.” The Settlement Agreement explicitly stated that both parties
agreed that any judgements resulting from Action Security litigation would
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be owed to Hight personally. Furthermore, Roberts signed in name only.
The Settlement Agreement stated that the agreement was between
Clarence Hight and Eric Roberts and no business titles or corporations
were included in the agreement. Therefore, the court held Roberts was
contracting only in his individual capacity. The court held that the rights
of Action Services could not be validly assigned from Hight because the
individuals, even if they are shareholders, were contracting only as
individuals based on the written language of the contract.
Next, the court addressed the statute of limitations argument. The
statute of limitations for the Uniform Trade Secrets Act is three years.
Tenn. Code. Ann. § 47-25-1707. The statute of limitations for an unfair
competition claim is one year, or three years for injury to personal property
or for loss of business value. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 47-18-110 and § 28-3105. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling that Hight
knew, or should have known, the facts that gave rise to his claim by March
2013, when he hired an investigator to look into Tramel. Therefore, the
statute of limitations expired in March 2016, preventing Hight’s February
2017 claim. Consequently, the breach of contract action against Tramel is
not valid.
Hight argued that the statute of limitations should follow the
continuing violations doctrine if Tramel continued to be employed by
A.C.E. Alarms. The “continuing violation doctrine,” codified in 42
U.S.C.S. § 2000(e), allows a plaintiff to bring a claim after the statute of
limitations period has run if the discriminatory conduct in question relates
back to conduct during the statute of limitations period. The continuing
violations doctrine has only historically applied to employment cases in
Tennessee. Snake Steel, Inc. v. Holladay Constr. Grp., LLC, No. M201900322-COA-R3-CV, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS, 2020 WL 365304 (Ct. App.
Jan. 22, 2020). This court has held that this doctrine is not meant to
provide a general exception to statute of limitations and should not apply
in this instance.
In this case, the appeals court affirmed the ruling of the trial court..
The court held that no language indicating Action Security was a party to
the Settlement Agreement existed. The agreement clearly identified the
two parties as Hight and Roberts. Therefore, Hight is not able to utilize
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the saving statute and step into Action Securities shoes. In addition, the
statute of limitations period had run by the time Hight brought a claim
against Tramel, and the continuing violation doctrine is not applicable.
The main takeaway from this case is that even if all of the stock in
the corporation is owned by a single stockholder, the corporation and its
stockholder remain distinct legal entities and an assignment by the
stockholder, absent language of his action being in the capacity of a
representative of the corporation, cannot create an assignment on behalf
of the corporation. Tennessee courts will continue to look at the text of
contracts for manifested intent. This is relevant for practicing attorneys in
Tennessee because they will want to adequately express their client’s intent
in the express language of the contract. Attorney’s need to make sure that
their client’s intentions are expressed in the agreement, and it is clarified if
they are being represented as an individual or acting on behalf of a
corporation. Furthermore, it is important that transactional attorneys in
Tennessee recognize that the continuing violations doctrine is not a catchall provision for an expiring statute of limitations period and will likely
continue to only apply to employment actions in the future.
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CONTRACTS - MISREPRESENTATION AND CONCEALMENT
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that when property
information is discoverable through ordinary diligence and available
via public records, plaintiffs have constructive knowledge of the
information and should not recover on claims asserting
concealment, misrepresentation, or breach of contract. Archer v. Home
Team, Inc., No. M2019-01898-COA-R3-CV, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 456,
2020 WL 6075705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2020).
Katherine McGonigal
In Archer v. Home Team, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Tennessee
looked at (1) whether a defendant has the duty to disclose information that
is a matter of public record and (2) whether a warranty deed that contains
both a purchase and sale agreement with the correct information about
acreage of a plot of land is ambiguous. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals
determined that a defendant does not have to disclose information that
can be discovered through ordinary diligence and that a warranty deed that
records the final plat of a property is not ambiguous, barring a plaintiff
from recovering on claims of misrepresentation, concealment, and breach
of contract.
Jeremy and Crystal Archer (“Plaintiffs”) sought to purchase a plot
of land for residential purposes from The Home Team, Inc. through
Steven Taylor, their realtor (each a “Defendant” and together the
“Defendants”). The Home Team listed two adjacent lots for sale,
identified as Lot 1, 1.9 acres, and Lot 2, 1.16 acres. Taylor posted the lots
on The Multiple Listing Service (“MLS”), where Plaintiffs saw the listing.
Lot 2 was improperly listed as being 1.9 acres on the MLS. However, both
plots had entries in a plat book in the county Deeds Office that listed the
correct acreage. On February 23, 2017, Plaintiffs and The Home Team
finalized a purchase and sale agreement for Lot 2. On April 6, 2017,
Plaintiffs moved onto the property. On April 10, 2017, Defendants
transferred title to Plaintiffs through a warranty deed. Plaintiffs also

2021]

CASE COMMENTARIES

137

signed a Disclaimer Notice that stated they had not relied upon any sort
of representation made by Defendants and that encouraged Plaintiffs to
verify the acreage of the property themselves.
On September 29, 2017, Plaintiffs filed suit alleging The Home
Team “was liable for intentional or reckless misrepresentation, nondisclosure or concealment, [and] breach of purchase contract . . . .”
Moreover, they claimed that Taylor “was liable for intentional or reckless
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and non-disclosure or
concealment.” Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendant’s owner and president
told them that Lot 2 was almost two acres and that they relied on that
information to buy the property.
Both Defendants filed motions for summary judgement on all
asserted claims. The Home Team argued that they did not post the
incorrect MLS and therefore was not liable for the misrepresentation and
concealment allegations. Furthermore, The Home Team argued and
submitted discovery showing that the public record of the plat, provided
for in the warranty deed, showed that Lot 2 was 1.16 acres, giving Plaintiffs
constructive notice. The Home Team also addressed the breach of
contract and warranty claims, stating they failed because of the doctrine of
merger, stating that the agreement that Plaintiffs signed merged into the
warranty deed and the final contract. Additionally, The Home Team
argues that though that warranty deed did not directly state the acreage of
the property, it acknowledged the final plat on record in the Deeds Office,
which had the proper acreage. The Home Team also contends that the
statements made to Plaintiffs by the owner were not made until after
Plaintiffs signed the purchase and sale agreement and therefore could not
have been relied upon. Plaintiffs filed an answer claiming that the
Defendants withheld information that provided for the correct acreage of
Lot 2, in addition to their previous claims that Defendants had purposely
misled Plaintiffs about the size of Lot 2, causing them to think they were
actually purchasing Lot 1.
The trial court held that because Plaintiffs lived on the property
before signing the purchase and sale agreement, and because that warranty
deed provided by The Home Team directs Plaintiffs to the public record
in the Plat Record, The Home Team did not misrepresent or conceal
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information from Plaintiffs. Therefore, the trial court ruled in favor of
The Home Team, granting partial summary judgement on all claims.
Taylor also filed a motion for summary judgement. While Taylor
acknowledged that his MLS listing had errors, he also claimed that
Plaintiffs had access to the publicly recorded plat book previously
mentioned and signed the disclaimer that encouraged Plaintiffs to verify
the acreage of the property on their own. Agreeing with these arguments,
the trial court also granted summary judgement on all claims in favor of
Taylor, noting that the signed disclaimer undercut all of Plaintiffs’
arguments. Based on Tenn. R. App. P. 3 and Tenn. R. App. P. 9, Plaintiffs
appealed.
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee agreed to hear the appeals de
novo “without a presumption of correctness” as set forth in Rye v. Women’s
Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015) (citing
Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997)). Pursuant to Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 56, the Court of Appeals examined whether there was a genuine
issue of material fact based on the filings of the parties. If no genuine issue
existed, summary judgement in favor of the defendants was proper.
Plaintiffs, as the non-moving party, must show facts proving that there
was a genuine issue. Such an issue exists when, “a reasonable jury could
legitimately resolve the fact in favor of one side or the other.” Byrd v. Hall,
847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993).
The court first examined the misrepresentation claims made
against The Home Team and Taylor. To prove intentional or reckless
misrepresentation, plaintiffs must show that at the time the alleged
misrepresentation took place, defendant made a representation of an
existing or past fact, the representation was false when made, the
representation was in regard to a material fact, it was made either
knowingly or without belief in its truth or recklessly, and that the plaintiff
suffered damage as a result of the misrepresentation. Walker v. Sunrise
Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tenn. 2008). To prove
negligent misrepresentation, plaintiffs must show that they relied on a false
statement supplied by a defendant who did not practice reasonable care in
finding or disseminating the untrue facts. Id. (citing Williams v. Berube &
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Assocs., 26 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Robinson v. Omer, 952
S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tenn. 1997)).
The court upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgement
because Plaintiffs’ intentional or reckless misrepresentation claim against
The Home Team revolved around one conversation with The Home
Team’s president and owner which occurred after Plaintiffs signed the
purchase and sale agreement. Therefore, the court found Plaintiffs did not
rely on The Home Team’s statement in purchasing the property, and “no
reasonable trier of fact” could find alternatively.
Regarding
the
intentional,
reckless,
and
negligent
misrepresentation claims against Taylor, the court agreed with the trial
court’s reasoning, upholding summary judgement. The court relied on the
fact that Plaintiffs signed a Disclaimer Notice stating that they would not
rely upon Taylor’s representations or the MLS listing in making their
decision and that the Plaintiffs would secure a surveyor for total acreage.
Once again, the court found that because of a signed document, no
reasonable trier of fact could find Plaintiffs’ claim legitimate.
Plaintiffs’ concealment claims must show that “the defendant has
a duty to disclose a known fact, the defendant fails to disclose that fact,
and the plaintiff reasonably relies on the resulting misrepresentation,
which causes injury.” Odom v. Oliver, 310 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009); Justice v. Anderson Co., 955 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
However, if ordinary diligence by Plaintiffs would have shown the
allegedly concealed fact, the defendants’ duty to disclose disappears. Id. at
350; PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI Ltd. P’ship v. Bluff City
Cmty. Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). The court
notes that as a general rule, to constitute fraud by concealment or
suppression of the truth, there must be something more than mere silence
or failure to disclose known facts. The court further notes that
concealment is withholding information asked for or making use of some
device to mislead, thus involving acts and intentions. Furthermore, where
a plaintiff has all material facts, whether actually or constructively, and still
chooses to purchase property, they cannot recover on the basis of fraud,
misrepresentation, or concealment of the information to which all parties
had equal access. Winstead v. First Tennessee Bank N.A., Memphis, 709 S.W.2d
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627, 633 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). Here, because the acreage was publicly
recorded and because Plaintiffs admitted during their depositions that they
were aware that they were purchasing Lot 2 despite the incorrect MLS
listing, the court found that the defendants had no duty to disclose Lot 2’s
acreage and affirmed the trial court’s summary judgement ruling.
Finally, the court addressed the claim that defendants selling a
1.16-acre lot to Plaintiffs, instead of a 1.9-acre lot breached the contract
between the parties. To succeed on their claim, Plaintiffs must show that
defendants did not perform on an existing contract, thus causing damages
to Plaintiffs. ARC LifeMed, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 1, 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
Because the purchase and sale agreement merged to create the warranty
deed which includes the final plat and correct acreage for Lot 2, “the
amount of acreage to be conveyed is unambiguous” and any parole
evidence Plaintiffs wanted brought in to show that the defendants caused
them to think Lot 1 was the property they were purchasing was
inadmissible. Therefore, the trial court’s granting of summary judgement
on the breach of contract claim was affirmed. Ultimately, the trial court’s
rulings on all of the claims, along with their reasoning were affirmed.
Attorney’s advising parties on matters concerning real property
should focus on making sure that their client fulfills their duty to conduct
ordinary diligence regarding facts about the property before entering into
any agreement. Furthermore, practitioners should be careful to check any
public records to verify any claims or statements made by a seller or their
representative(s) before letting their clients sign a contract, particularly for
real property. A duty to disclose information may only apply when a fact
could not be discovered through ordinary diligence.
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LANDLORD-TENANT DAMAGES – GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that good faith and fair
dealing do not create additional contractual rights or obligations,
and cannot be used to avoid or alter the terms of an unambiguous
agreement. Loans Yes v. Kroger Ltd., No. M2019-01506-COA-R3-CV,
2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486, 2020 WL 6386884 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30,
2020).
Kevin Ross
In Loans Yes v. Kroger Ltd., the Tennessee Court of Appeals
addressed whether a commercial tenant owes damages to a landlord when
the landlord agrees to, yet subsequently fails, to find a replacement tenant
prior to the termination of their existing lease. The appellate court
presumes the correctness of the trial courts findings but reviews the law
and interpretation of the contract de novo. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d); Blair
v. Brownson, 197 S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tenn. 2006), Perkins v. Metro. Gov't of
Nashville, 380 S.W.3d 73 (Tenn. 2012). Upon review, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals held that a commercial tenant owes damages to a landlord
when the landlord agrees to and subsequently fails to find a replacement
tenant if the landlord searched with good faith and fair dealing.
Loans Yes (“Tenant”) rented commercial space from Kroger
Limited Partnership I (“Landlord”) in LaVergne, Tennessee for a five-year
term. The original lease began in May 2008 and ended April 30, 2013.
The parties extended the lease to April 30, 2018, through a lease extension
agreement, ratifying and affirming the provisions from the original lease.
Each year, the monthly rent increased by $50, growing from $1,750 per
month to $1,900 per month by the end of the term.
Tenant informed Landlord in January 2017 that it wanted to
terminate the lease early. On February 3, 2017, Landlord, Tenant, and
Colliers International (“Broker”) entered into a broker’s agreement where
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Broker would “use its best efforts” to find a new tenant for Landlord, who
retained absolute discretion in the matter.
In late May or early June 2017, Ryan Widenhofer, under Broker’s
employment, began communicating with a commercial real estate broker
representing Naser Ghaly, a prospective replacement tenant. On
November 22, 2017, Mr. Ghaly signed a draft lease, but ultimately changed
his mind before Landlord could sign. Mr. Widenhofer marketed the
property from February 2017 until the installation of a new tenant, which
was after the termination of Tenant’s lease.
Tenant vacated the property in July 2017. On October 20, 2017,
Landlord’s regional property manager emailed Tenant informing it that
Landlord would not sign a lease with Mr. Ghaly until Tenant’s account
was current. This was not the first email the property manager had sent
reminding the Tenant of the rent owed. Tenant at the time owed
$4,026.53 and an additional $402.65 in late fees. The parties’ broker
agreement provided that Tenant must comply with all lease terms and
conditions, along with all monetary obligations being paid in accordance
with the lease prior to the Landlord signing a new lease. Tenant paid rent
through October 2017.
On December 6, 2017, Tenant filed suit against Landlord, seeking
$24,999 in damages for failing to find a replacement tenant after Tenant
had vacated the property. In response, Landlord counterclaimed on a
breach of contract theory and requested removal to the circuit court. In
the circuit court, Tenant filed an amended complaint. Landlord moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, responded, and filed a breach of
contract counterclaim. Tenant filed another amended complaint, which
Landlord moved for dismissal on the same grounds. The court dismissed
Tenant’s claim with prejudice.
Only Landlord’s claim against Tenant for breach of contract
remained, which the trial court tried on November 27, 2017, and issued a
final order for on January 27, 2018. The court found that Landlord was
not obligated to lease the property to another tenant prior to Tenant’s
existing lease. While Tenant argued that Landlord failed to mitigate its
damages, the court disagreed and ultimately granted Landlord $22,337.29
in damages, interest, and fees, along with $26,390.48 in attorney’s fees.
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Tenant appealed to the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, reasserting that
Landlord was liable for failing to mitigate damages and challenging the trial
court’s “award of damages and attorney’s fees.”
The appellate court reviewed findings of fact with a presumption
of correctness. Contrastingly, the appellate court reviewed questions of
law, including contract interpretation, de novo, with no presumption of
correctness.
Because neither party argued ambiguity in the lease, the appellate
court limited its analysis to the contents of the contract. The appellate
court deferred to its prior reasoning in Cadence Bank, N.A. v. The Alpha
Trust, 473 S.W.3d 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015), explaining that the implied
obligation of good faith and fair dealing is “‘(1) to honor the reasonable
expectations of the contracting parties and (2) to protect the rights of the
parties to receive the benefits of the agreement into which they entered.’”
First, the court considered Tenant’s claim against Landlord for
failure to mitigate damages. The court notes that contracts in Tennessee
include an implicit obligation by the parties to act in good faith and use
fair dealing in performing and enforcing their contracts. However, the
court also notes that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing does not
create additional contractual rights or obligations and cannot be used to
avoid or alter the terms of an agreement. The court reaffirms that a party
injured by another’s breach of contract must attempt to mitigate their
damages; however, the breaching party carries the burden of proof for
failure to mitigate damages. The appellate court noted that “Tenant must
be in compliance with all Lease terms and conditions along with all
monetary obligations being paid in accordance with the Lease prior to the
Landlord signing a new Lease.”
While Tenant argued that delays in acquiring a new tenant were
because of Landlord, the appellate court found that Tenant’s delinquent
account was reason for delay. Further, the appellate court reasoned that
Landlord did not cause delays because it worked with Mr. Ghaly up until
Mr. Ghaly chose to rent elsewhere. Also, the appellate court noted that
there was no obligation to sign with a new tenant, but Landlord and
Broker continued their search from February 2017 until they found a new
tenant. As a result, the appellate court held that Landlord did not violate
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its “obligation of good faith or fair dealing or was unreasonable in its
attempts to mitigate damages by finding a replacement tenant before
Tenant's five-year term ended.”
Next, the court considered the damages and interest awarded by
the trial court. The appellate court applied the standard from Lee Med, Inc.
v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2010), holding that a court abuses its
discretion by “(1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an
illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Tenant argued that the calculation
of rent and fees for November 2017 through April 2018 was “an estimate
and not the actual amount owed,” but the appellate court did not find an
abuse in the trial court’s discretion. However, the appellate court did not
understand the trial court’s calculation of late fees. The appellate court
adjusted the late fees due from $6,077.72 to $4,922.40 based on the “Rent
Delinquency” section of the lease, which set the late penalty at ten percent
of total rent due. As for prejudgment interest, because the appellate court
adjusted the damages owed to Landlord, and since the appellate court was
unaware of the interest rate used by the trial court to calculate prejudgment
interest, the appellate court remanded the case with instructions to
calculate fees based on a ten percent annual rate. Ten percent is the
maximum rate of prejudgment interest that a trial court may award in
Tennessee.
For attorney’s fees, the trial court looked to the lease agreement,
as it outlined two methods by which Tenant may be liable to Landlord:
“(1) if Landlord must seek to recover unpaid rents from Tenant, and (2) if
Landlord prevails in litigation or alternative dispute resolution against the
Tenant.” Tenant argued that because Landlord only won in the circuit
court but not in general sessions, Tenant was not liable to Landlord for
attorney’s fees. The appellate court disagreed. The court opined that
Landlord expended fees to collect its rent. thereby affirming the trial
court’s judgement.
Ultimately, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s award of damages and attorney’s fees to Landlord, only diverging
to recalculate interest on the damages. The appellate court relied on the
trial court’s findings of fact, while reviewing questions of law and
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interpretation of contracts de novo. This ruling reaffirms the freedom that
contracting parties enjoy, binding the parties to the covenants they made
upon agreement. The importance of unambiguous contract in court, as
evidenced by this case, cannot be overstated. Practicing attorneys must
remain vigilant when drafting contracts for their clients. It is also
important for transactional attorneys to properly understand the
intricacies of good faith, fair dealing, and the obligation to mitigate
damages so that they can properly counsel their clients and advise them
on their contractual obligations.
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CONTRACTS – AMBIGUITY AND CONSTRUCTION
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that where a contract is
ambiguous and the surrounding facts and circumstances support an
interpretation of the contract as an owner-financed lease purchase
agreement, the lease purchase agreement is enforceable, and the
purchaser is entitled to ownership upon fulfillment of the terms
under the agreement. Carter v. Butler, No. W2020-00169-COA-R3-CV,
2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2021).
Zachary Simons
In Carter v. Butler, No. W2020-00169-COA-R3-CV, 2021 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2021), the Tennessee Court of
Appeals addressed whether an ambiguous lease purchase agreement
consisting of a finance component may nevertheless constitute a valid
lease purchase agreement. Under the general principles of contract
interpretation, when a contract is ambiguous, a court must consider the
intention of the contracting parties at the time the agreement was entered
into while giving deference to purported agreements that are fair and
equitable “[w]here the language in the agreement is contradictory, obscure
or ambiguous[.]” Id. at *15. Further, when a contracting party drafts the
agreement, the language therein will be construed against the drafter, and
courts may consider extrinsic evidence in ascertaining and effectuating the
parties’ intent. Id. at *16.
On appeal, the court found that where a contract is ambiguous,
and the intent of the parties are “diametrically opposed,” a court is
permitted to consider extraneous evidence, including the parties’ conduct,
in reaching a proper interpretation that is supported by the surrounding
facts and circumstances. Upon review, the court held that the ambiguous
contract was a lease purchase agreement with components akin to a
finance agreement, and upon fulfillment of the terms of the agreement,
the property was purchased, with title vested in the purchaser.
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On or about April 23, 2013, Yolanda Carter entered into an
agreement, entitled “Lease Purchase Agreement for 3200 Cherrywood
Cove Memphis TN, 38128,” (the “Lease Purchase Agreement”) with
Maurice Butler. Both parties agree that Carter’s intention was to purchase
the subject property, “as she was already renting another property.” Id. at
*3. However, due to Carter’s lack of income and poor credit, Carter
would not qualify for a traditional loan. As a result, Butler structured an
agreement that called for payments of $1,000 per month for fifty-four
months. The Lease Agreement also required a “security deposit” in the
amount of $10,000. Both parties agreed that the $10,000 payment was, in
essence, a non-refundable down payment. At the time that the Agreement
was executed, Carter believed that Butler was financing the property
during the lease term, and upon final payment, Appellant would transfer
ownership of the property.
Accordingly, in March of 2016, Carter contacted Butler and
expressed her intention to pay the remaining balance due under the
Agreement. Butler advised Carter to continue making monthly payments,
in accordance with the Agreement, until October 23, 2017. Carter agreed,
and upon final payment, Carter requested that Butler deed the property in
Carter’s name. However, Butler disagreed with Carter’s interpretation of
the Lease Purchase Agreement and refused to transfer title.
Consequently, in January of 2018, Butler brought a forcible entry
and detainer action against Carter in general sessions court, seeking
possession of the property. The following month, Carter filed a complaint
in chancery court (the “trial court”), demanding specific performance and
an injunction. On July 13, 2018, the trial court granted Carter a preliminary
injunction, and a bench trial was held on July 17, 2018. Butler contended
that Carter must comply with the terms under a second agreement
(“Option Agreement”), which Butler testified that both parties went over
“line by line”, to take ownership of the property. Id. at *8.
Under the Option Agreement, Carter could purchase the property
for an additional $55,000, with the $10,000 “security deposit” credited to
the total purchase price of $65,000, upon fulfillment of the terms of the
Lease Purchase Agreement. However, Carter testified that Butler never
mentioned that “she had other terms to fulfill before she could purchase
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the property[.]” Id. at *7. Moreover, the Lease Purchase Agreement did
not reference the Option Agreement. Upon review, the trial court held
that the Lease Purchase Agreement was in fact enforceable, awarding
Carter ownership of the property in question.
On August 10, 2018, Butler filed a motion to reconsider and a
motion to alter or amend judgment. Butler then filed a memorandum
arguing that the trial court erroneously treated the lease purchase
agreement as a finance agreement. The court stated, among other things,
the Lease Purchase Agreement contains “numerous ambiguities” and was
properly interpreted as a lease purchase agreement. Id. at *9. As a result,
the court denied Butler’s motions and reinstated its previous order of
August 1, 2018. Butler then appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals
in which the court vacated and remanded the case instructing the trial
court to make additional findings of fact.
On January 8, 2020, the trial court entered a revised order of
judgment. One notable distinction between the court’s previous order and
its amended order is its interpretation of the Lease Purchase Agreement
as “a lease purchase with an option to [purchase.]” Id. at *10. The court
based its finding, in part, on the credibility of Carter’s testimony and the
fact that Butler drafted the Lease Purchase Agreement. Butler appealed
once more to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the court was presented with the single issue of
whether the trial court erred in treating the lease purchase agreement as a
finance agreement. The court held that due to the ambiguity of the
contract and the parties’ conflicting interpretation, that the trial court’s
interpretation was a question of fact entitled to a presumption of
correctness on appeal. As an initial matter, the court noted Butler’s
misunderstanding of the term “lease purchase agreement” as no prior
authority suggests that a lease purchase agreement and a finance
agreement are “mutually exclusive.” Id. at *26. Indeed, the court stated
that “[Butler] cites nothing that prohibits the parties from providing for
owner-financing as part of a lease purchase agreement.” Id. at *27. The
court recognized that partiers are free to contract as they wish and that
courts should carry out the terms bargained for in the contract unless
those terms violate public policy. Further, Butler suggests in his brief that
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lease purchase agreements generally provide tenants with an option to
purchase the property upon final payment.
In the absence of a definition within the Lease Purchase
Agreement, the court “turn[ed] to dictionary definitions to inform [its]
interpretation.” Id. Accordingly, the court followed the definition as
applied in Black's Law Dictionary 973 (9th ed. 2009), defining a “lease
purchase agreement” as “a rent-to-own purchase plan under which the
buyer takes possession of the goods with the first payment and takes
ownership with the final payment.” Id. Thus, the court held that
considering the parties’ designation of the Lease Purchase Agreement as a
“lease purchase agreement,” “the trial court’s finding that the lease
purchase agreement contained a finance component . . . does not appear
to be a transformation of the contract beyond what is contemplated by a
‘lease purchase agreement.’” Id. at *27–28.
The court then addressed Butler’s argument that a lease purchase
agreement is not one but two separate agreements: a lease and an option
to purchase. Butler argued that the trial court’s treatment of the Lease
Purchase Agreement as a finance agreement rendered the lease portion
irrelevant while disregarding the option to purchase. The court quickly
struck down Butler’s argument. First, the court noted, the trial court did
not disregard an option within the Lease Purchase Agreement because “no
option was actually made a part of the parties’ signed agreement.” Id. at
*29.
In its amended order, the trial court interpreted the Lease Purchase
Agreement as a “lease purchase agreement with an option to [purchase.]”
Id. at *10. Although the court declared that no option exists within the
Lease Purchase Agreement, the court suggests that the premise of Carter’s
argument is that upon requesting ownership after the fifty-fourth
payment, Carter essentially exercised her “option” to purchase. In so
finding, the court relied on the trial court’s ruling that Carter’s testimony
and the extrinsic evidence weighed in favor of a lease purchase agreement
with “an option to [purchase] after the end of the lease.” Id. Thus, the
court held that the Butler’s attempt to insert an Option Agreement into
the Agreement “alter[s] the agreement far more than conforming to
Carter’s proposed interpretation.” Id. at *31.
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The court also held that the trial court’s interpretation did not
render the terms of the Agreement irrelevant. In reviewing the Lease
Purchase Agreement, the court noted several provisions that were typical
of leases while also noting several provisions that were atypical of leases.
The Lease Purchase Agreement contained standard language, such as
terms referring to each party as “landlord” and “tenant.” Id. at *32.
However, at times, the Lease Purchase Agreement refers to each party as
“buyer” and “seller.” Id. at *33. Even more convincing, the court notes,
the Lease Purchase Agreement contains a substantial security deposit and
a fifty-four-month term which is not typical of leases. Butler’s prior leases
for the property contained considerably smaller security deposits and oneyear lease terms.
Moreover, the court observed that a lease term of fifty-four
months plus a $10,000 “security deposit” “amount to a dollar figure
inexplicably close to the amount that Butler himself admitted he was
willing to sell the home for.” Id. As was suggested by the court, “neither
the trial court nor this Court is required to check common sense at the
courthouse door[.]” Id. at *32. Accordingly, the court held that the Lease
Purchase Agreement’s lengthy lease term, substantial security deposit,
occasional references to the parties as “buyer” and “seller,” and the fact
that Butler drafted the Lease Purchase Agreement supported Carter’s
position.
Ultimately, the court upheld the trial court’s ruling that the Lease
Purchase Agreement was properly interpreted as a lease purchase
agreement, and Carter’s fifty-fourth payment fulfilled all the terms under
the Lease Purchase Agreement, entitling her to ownership of the property.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals ruling in this case belabors the
importance for transactional lawyers to draft definite agreements so that
all parties are fully aware of their obligations. A transactional lawyer who
drafts an ambiguous agreement and leaves the parties’ intent open to
debate may result in the lawyer, and more importantly, the client, facing
unintended consequences, such as forfeiting property worth $65,000 due
to unnecessary ambiguities within a lease purchase agreement.
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CONTRACTS – UNILATERAL CHANGES
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
the unilateral addition of an arbitration provision by a financial
institution in its service agreement with consumers is invalid due to
it being unreasonable and violating the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Sevier Cnty. Sch. Fed. Credit Union v. Branch Banking
& Tr. Co., No. 20-5174, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6464 (6th Cir. Mar. 5,
2021).
Christian Wilkinson
In Sevier County Sch. Fed. Credit Union v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co.,
the Sixth Circuit decided whether the merits of a dispute about a
contractual provision should be determined by a court or an arbitrator.
More specifically, the court addressed whether the Plaintiffs in this action,
Sevier County Schools Federal Credit Union and other account holders,
assented to the new terms in their agreement created by the Defendant,
Branch Banking & Trust Company (“BB&T”). Under Tennessee law, for
two parties to be bound by a valid contract there must be two elements
present: consideration and mutual assent. Moreover, when one party
unilaterally amends a term of the contract, the amendment must be (1)
reasonable and (2) in accordance with the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The court held that BB&T’s amendment was
unreasonable in light of the original agreement that the Plaintiffs had
assented, and that BB&T defied the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing by attempting to enforce the unfair provision.
In 1989, the Plaintiffs opened Money Market Investment
Accounts (“MMIAs”) with First National Bank of Gatlinburg (“FNB”)
accompanied with a guaranteed annual interest rate that would “never fall
below 6.5%.” The agreement with FNB was two pages long and included
no provision that specifically restricted the Plaintiffs’ ability to enforce the
agreement in court if they so wished. In particular, the change-of-terms
provision in the agreement stated that the terms of the agreement may be
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changed by the bank “from time to time” and such change effected on the
“expiration of a thirty-day period” or “the making or delivery of notice
thereof to the depositor by the notice in the depositor’s monthly statement
for one month.” In March 1997, FNB and BankFirst of Tennessee
(“BankFirst”) merged, and BankFirst honored the 6.5% annual interest
rate for four years until merging with BB&T in July of 2001. After the
acquisition of BankFirst, BB&T allegedly sent a Bank Services Agreement
(“BSA”) to each account holder, essentially detailing that BB&T reserved
the right to amend the BSA, account holders would be given notice of
amendments, and “continued use of an account after receipt of notice
constituted acceptance of the amendment.” The original BSA included an
arbitration provision stating, “‘You and [BB&T] each have the option of
requiring that any dispute or controversy concerning your account be
decided by binding arbitration.’”
After 2001, BB&T amended the BSA twice, once in 2004 and
again in 2017. The 2004 amendment did not alter much; it simply included
a class action waiver and eliminated the types of damages available to the
account holders. The 2017 amendment, the subject of this litigation,
substantially altered the BSA. On the front page of the agreement in bold
letters, the arbitration provision now read, “[The arbitration provision]
PROVIDES THAT YOU MAY BE REQUIRED TO SETTLE A
CLAIM OR DISPUTE THROUGH ARBITRATION EVEN IF YOU
PREFER TO LITIGATE SUCH CLAIMS IN COURT.” The
amendment further provided that “any dispute, claim, controversy or
cause of action . . . that arises out of or relates to this Agreement . . . shall
be determined by arbitration.” Moreover, BB&T allegedly notified each
customer of this amendment as promised in the original BSA, and the
Plaintiffs continued use of their accounts following the 2017 Amendment.
While BB&T honored the 6.5% interest rate from 2001 until 2018 in the
original MMIAs, BB&T decided to lower this rate to 1.05% in January
2018. At this point, the original two-page agreement binding the Plaintiffs
in 1989 had now reached thirty-three pages.
The Plaintiffs filed an action against BB&T in the Circuit Court
for Sevier County in March 2019. BB&T subsequently removed the action
to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at
Knoxville granted BB&T’s motion, finding that the Plaintiffs “took action
sufficient to manifest assent by continuing to maintain their accounts with
BB&T.” As such, the district court found it significant that the Plaintiffs
did not protest the arbitration provision during the time period leading up
to the change in interest rate. The action discussed after the district court’s
conclusion is an appeal by the Plaintiffs in The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Upon review, the Sixth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district
court’s conclusion, primarily for the reason that the district court “fail[ed]
to address whether the BSAs are invalid by virtue of exceeding the scope
of the original change-of-terms provision.” The Sixth Circuit emphasized
that the amendment at issue by BB&T must be “(1) reasonable, and (2)
not in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”
(citing Hathaway v. Hathaway, 98 S.W.3d 675, 678–79 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2002). The court also felt that the district court’s analysis was lacking in
that the district court had hardly addressed the Plaintiffs’ argument “that
BB&T’s addition of the arbitration provision . . . was inconsistent with the
substance of the original change-of-terms provision.” The district court’s
reasoning on this subject was only two sentences long with no cited
authority within.
The court began their analysis by outlining two essential elements
in the formation of a valid contract: consideration and mutual assent. The
court notes that a contract must result from a meeting of the minds of the
parties in mutual assent to the terms, must be based upon sufficient
consideration, and must be free from fraud or undue influence. The court
also notes that it can’t be contrary to public policy and must be sufficiently
definite as to be enforced. The court held that consideration was present
between the Plaintiffs and BB&T because “state and federal courts have
consistently found that consideration exists so long as the arbitration
agreement binds both parties.” Pyburn v. Beard Hill Chevrolet, 63 S.W.3d 351,
358 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The court notes that mutuality of a promise is
sufficient consideration in the state of Tennessee. The arbitration
agreement binds both parties and as such the court found that to be
sufficient consideration. However, the court opined that there was no
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mutual assent because the Plaintiffs’ consent was lacking. The court found
that Tennessee courts are consistent in holding that, even though an action
as explicit as a signature is not necessary for mutual assent, mutual assent
should not be inferred from unilateral acts or by an ambiguous course of
dealings. The court notes that the flaw in the district court’s reasoning is
that it places the burden on consumers to object to a company’s unilateral
arbitration policy or risk being found to have agreed to it.
Finally, the court applied a reasonableness and covenant of good
faith and fair dealing analysis. As to the reasonableness requirement, the
Sixth Circuit found it significant that the Plaintiffs argued any changes to
the original agreement must be narrowed only to those terms in the
original agreement. Simply put, the Plaintiffs argued that a dispute
resolution term should not be changed because the original agreement did
not contain any provision mentioning dispute resolution. This argument
originated primarily from Badie v. Bank of America where the court found
an analogous change of a provision “did not give the bank the right to
unilaterally add an arbitration provision to the account holder’s original
agreement.” Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998). Moreover, a change must be “‘a modification whose general
subject matter was anticipated when the contract was entered into.’” Id.
The court felt it made sense to apply Badie here where it was uncertain if
the Plaintiffs were even aware of or had received the BSA and its
subsequent amendments. The court found BB&T’s argument that Badie
is hardly given any weight in other states unpersuasive. Other states have
only opted to not apply Badie in circumstances where the consumers had
“‘meaningful opportunity’ to opt out of the arbitration provision.” Even
if the Plaintiffs here had the opportunity to opt out of the arbitration
provision, the court still found BB&T’s argument implausible because
other courts have applied Badie where consumers had the chance to opt
out. The court acknowledged Badie as directly on point with the case at
hand. Here, the Sixth Circuit reasoned the Plaintiffs had no opt out
opportunity and their only choice was to comply with the arbitration
provision, as amended, or close their savings accounts. As a result, the
unreasonableness of the choices left to the Plaintiffs was the
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disappearance of the very reason most of them possessed the accounts,
the 6.5% interest rate.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit found that BB&T violated the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “in its attempt to use the
original change-of-terms provision to force the Plaintiffs to arbitrate.”
The court once again found the analysis in Badie relevant, concluding that
a party “does not act in an ‘objectively reasonable’ manner . . . by adding
an entirely new term which has no bearing on any subject . . . in the original
contract.” Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284. This is especially true when the
additional term prohibits the right of a party to choose where they want a
potential dispute resolved. Id. Additionally, the court also found it
noteworthy that BB&T respected the 6.5% interest rate guarantee for a
period of sixteen and a half years. In other words, intuitively, it made little
sense to conclude the Plaintiffs might be aware that one day they may lose
this guarantee and be limited to resolving it through arbitration. Relying
on the reasoning set out above, the Sixth Circuit concluded the arbitration
provision added by BB&T unreasonably left the Plaintiffs with few
options for recovery and violated the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Consequently, BB&T’s motion to dismiss was reversed and
remanded, and the Plaintiffs were not compelled to arbitrate.
In a lengthy dissent, one judge disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s
holding, contending that the Plaintiffs assented to the arbitration provision
and its amendments by BB&T. Contrary to the court’s holding, the dissent
agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the Plaintiffs assented to
the arbitration provision by maintaining their accounts with BB&T after
being notified of the amendments. In regard to the fact that BB&T
honored the 6.5% interest rate for sixteen years, the dissent came to
exactly the opposite conclusion of the court by deducing BB&T “had
every reason to believe that plaintiffs had consented to the arbitration
agreement and subsequent amendments.” As such, the dissent saw the
Plaintiffs, not BB&T, as “‘trying to wriggle out of a commitment made
years ago.’”
In light of the court’s holding in this case, transactional attorneys
in Tennessee should make their clients fully aware of the importance of
mutual assent, no matter what side of the bargain the client is on. If either
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side took the time to clearly manifest assent or disagreement here and
document it, there likely would not be litigation. For example, a
transactional attorney for the Plaintiffs in this action might have made the
client aware that they should either clearly assent or object to any
amendment made in the document. Similarly, in advising BB&T, one
might advise such a financial institution that they either receive some sort
of assent or objection to any amendment they make. If either side acts on
silence, litigation is much more likely to follow an obscurity around mutual
assent. This ruling also serves to reiterate that courts can and do give
deference to the discrepancy in bargaining power between the parties in
an agreement. Courts seem lean towards protecting consumers in
contracts of adhesion. Transactional attorneys that are drafting
agreements between large institutions and consumers must be cognizant
to how a court is likely to interpret any unilateral change by the institution.

